报告题目： Revisiting the role of prevention measure in the design of optimal insurance
报告时间： 9月8日下午3:00
报告地点： 临江楼A914-915
报告摘要： This paper reexamines the strategic integration of prevention measures within optimal insurance contracting frameworks. We model an insured agent with preference for distortion risk measures who simultaneously determines the demand for prevention (e.g., self-insurance and self-protection) and market insurance. By analytically characterizing the optimal indemnity function and prevention effort, we derive sufficient conditions under which prevention acts as a substitute or complement to market insurance. These conditions are linked to the monotonicity properties of the insurer's expected payoff with respect to the insured's prevention effort. Our analysis reveals that traditional self-insurance is inherently a substitute for market insurance, while self-protection may exhibit either substitutive or complementary behavior depending on the risk preferences and structural parameters. To address potential ex ante moral hazard arising from strategic misreporting of prevention effort, we develop two distinct contractual mechanisms. The first employs extreme ambiguity regarding claim investigation outcomes, while the second formalizes cooperation between insurers and prevention providers to eliminate information asymmetry. Within cooperative frameworks, pricing strategies diverge significantly: substitutive prevention commands premium pricing whereas complementary prevention warrants subsidization. Numerical validation demonstrates how bargaining power allocation and loss distribution characteristics shape implementable strategies.
个人简介：姜文骏，加拿大卡尔加里大学数学与统计系副教授。他于2019年在加拿大西安大略大学取得统计学博士学位(精算方向)。主要研究方向为最优(再)保险，风险分散，巨灾建模。主要研究成果发表在EJOR，IME，ASTIN，SAJ，FRL等期刊上。
管理工程学院
2025年9月4日
